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his article presents a textbook exposition of
the effects that institutional design of the
firm has on allocation of control over assets.
The efficient allocation of control over the assets
bundled up in the firm is necessary for the optimal
allocation of its resources. Dynamic efficiency in
resource allocation presupposes that control over
firms will change hands when a given allocation
turns suboptimal. The institutional framework with-
in which control changes hands is called the market
for corporate control. This market is closely linked
to the stock market as control rights over the assets
of the firm are linked to voting stock. We analyze
how the allocation of shareholder voting rights and
other organizational designs of the firm affect the
firm’s stock market valuation and the allocation of
control over its assets.
Transactions in the market for corporate control
have increased greatly over the last decade both in
number and value. Figure 1 shows that in the United
States the number of acquisitions of publicly traded
companies quadrupled between a trough in 1991
and a recent peak in 1999. Measured in dollar terms
(without inflation adjustment), the rise in acquisi-
tions of publicly traded companies was 30-fold
during that period. Among the 50 industries distin-
guished by Mergerstat (2000, pp. 61-69), “Banking
& Finance” was among the seven most active indus-
tries in any year in the 1996-2000 period as mea-
sured by number of transactions announced. Based
on the dollar value offered in announced acquisi-
tions, Banking & Finance was among the six most
active industries in that same period and topped the
rankings in the years 1997 and 1998.
The mechanics of the market for corporate
control are determined by the legal system. Most
importantly, the legal system shapes the incentive
structure to which the participants in the market for
corporate control respond in their actions. More-
over, the incentive structure in place has impor-
tant efficiency implications. If designed optimally,
society’s legal system directs the self-interest of
economic agents toward the optimal social outcome.
Most significant to the legal framework of the
market for corporate control are the firm’s articles
of association and bylaws. There is also Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation, and
there are the specific rules of the respective stock
exchanges (such as the New York Stock Exchange,
Nasdaq, and the American Stock Exchange).
Articles of association and bylaws vary across
corporations. For instance, corporations may have
the choice to amend their articles of association
such that unsolicited bidders find it difficult to obtain
control over the assets. The legal options that are
available to corporations vary across state lines. For
instance, a wide variety of anti-takeover amend-
ments exist for Delaware corporations, such as super-
majority rules for decisions that pertain to mergers
or to the removal of board members.1 There are also
cross-country differences in corporations’ articles
of association, which become important in cross-
border merger and acquisitions transactions.
Acquisitions of publicly traded companies typi-
cally involve block trades or tender offers. In a block
trade, an investor acquires a block of shares from a
large shareholder. In a tender offer, an investor bids
for shares that are dispersed across a multitude of
mostly small shareholders. Block trades are public
transactions, while tender offers are private deals.
Both types of transactions might be preceded,
accompanied, or followed by acquisitions of shares
in the open market. Changes in control that occur
through block trades are common on the European
continent, where tender offers are rare.2In the United
States, on the other hand, 27 percent of all acquisi-
tions of publicly traded companies in 2000 were
brought about through tender offers (see Figure 2).
Two kinds of value matter for wealth-
maximization when control over the firm changes
hands. First, there is what is commonly referred to
as the public value of the firm, i.e., the market value
of its securities. Second, there might be a private
value of the firm, through which an investor enjoys
some benefit while exercising control over the firm.
Private control benefits are most significant for
entrepreneurial start-ups, established family-owned
businesses, and organizations where personal
investors also pursue non-pecuniary goals, such
1 See <http://www.uslegalforms.com/corporations/table13.htm>.
2 See, for instance, Franks and Mayer (2000), who study control changes
in Germany.
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tions.3 Maximizing social welfare necessitates that,
when control changes, the sum of the public and
the private values of the firm assumes its highest
value.4
The following analysis assumes well-defined
property rights for the various stakeholders in the
firm, such as labor, bond holders, the tax authorities,
suppliers, and customers. Enforceability of property
rights precludes opportunistic behavior by the
bidder. Absent the enforceability of such property
rights, takeovers, even if they destroy value overall,
might be worthwhile for the bidder if he succeeds
in increasing his wealth at the expense of other
stakeholders, such as bondholders and labor.5
Three institutional designs in corporate control,
according to the finance literature, are most signifi-
cant to wealth-maximization in takeovers: These
are the one share–one vote principle, majority rules,
and mandatory tender offers. We analyze the impli-
cations of these three organizational designs in a
simple textbook takeover model that is drafted along
the lines of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Hart
(1995). The model helps define the optimal design
of the legal environment in which takeovers enhance
social welfare.
In the following section we present the frame-
work that we use for analyzing the efficiency impli-
cations of institutional design as they apply to
corporate control. A brief discussion of the relation-
ship between takeovers and auctions follows. The
subsequent analysis of takeovers draws on Hart
(1995) but extends his analysis in several ways. We
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3 See Demsetz (1983).
4 See Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 35-38).
5 See Shleifer and Summers (1988).
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Figure 1address issues of free-riding in tender offers, stock
ownership disclosure regulation, the one share–
one vote principle, private control benefits, majority
rules, and mandatory tender offers.
CORPORATE CONTROL AND
TAKEOVERS: AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK
Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv
(1988) analyze the effects that deviations from the
one share–one vote principle and the simple major-
ity rule have on the value of the firm. Grossman and
Hart take the perspective of the securities holders
and restrict themselves to the implications for the
public value of the firm. Harris and Raviv, on the
other hand, take the perspective of society by look-
ing at both the public and private values of the firm.
Both papers allow for private control benefits and
present the takeover mechanism as a tender offer
to dispersed shareholders. No block trades among
big shareholders are considered.
In Grossman and Hart (1988), the subjective
probability of the small shareholder being pivotal
to the outcome of a takeover attempt is zero. Harris
and Raviv (1988), on the other hand, allow for this
probability to be positive. This difference between
the two studies explains some of the differences in
results.
Grossman and Hart (1988) investigate three
cases. In their first case, they look at an efficiently
operated company with dual-class stock. Half the
stock is voting stock, while the other half is non-
voting stock. Both classes of stocks are endowed
with the same cash flow rights, and the incumbent
investor does not enjoy benefits from control. Tender
offers are unrestricted, which means that the bidder
must take in all shares tendered to him rather than
just a fraction of the stock. Grossman and Hart show
that, in such a regime, a rival investor who would
enjoy private control benefits but operate the firm
inefficiently might succeed in obtaining control.
The reason is that the investor needs to bid for the
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Figure 2voting stock only. The holders of the nonvoting
stock go uncompensated for the loss they suffer
from the rival investor’s inefficient management.
In a one share–one vote regime, on the other hand,
the rival investor must acquire all of the company’s
stock. In a tender offer under this regime, the rival
investor would have to pay at least the price at which
the stock is trading under the current, efficient
management. Thus, the one share–one vote principle
maximizes the public value of the firm.
In their second case, Grossman and Hart allow
for both the incumbent and the rival investor to
enjoy private control benefits. They assume that the
investor who enjoys the greatest control benefits is
also the investor who operates the company most
efficiently. Under this assumption, the company
takes on a maximum value if its stock is split into
two extreme securities: one class of shares endowed
with voting rights only, the other class of shares
endowed with cash flow rights only. The two com-
peting investors bid for the voting stock. The investor
with the greater control benefits is more willing to
pay and consequently wins out. Because this investor
is also the one who runs the company efficiently,
the owners of the nonvoting stock benefit as well.
This scenario maximizes the public value of the firm.
(Grossman and Hart point out that the assumptions
made in this case are rather restrictive; the results
thus cannot be read as a general recommendation
for the public firm to deviate from the one share–
one vote principle.)
In their third case, Grossman and Hart (1988)
allow for restricted tender offers. In a restricted ten-
der offer, the bidder can limit the shares he acquires
to a pre-announced fraction. The authors show that
a restricted tender offer for 50 percent of the voting
stock in a one share–one vote regime is similar to
an unrestricted offer in a dual-class stock regime
where 50 percent of the cash flow rights are associ-
ated with nonvoting stock. Grossman and Hart also
analyze the optimality of the simple majority rule,
where decisionmaking requires 50 percent plus
one vote. They show that the one share–one vote
principle and the simple majority rule are optimal
when the controlling party’s private control bene-
fits substantially exceed the rival investor’s private
control benefits.
In summary, Grossman and Hart (1988) show
that deviations from the one share–one vote rule
for public, widely held corporations are likely to be
suboptimal. Deviations from the one share–one vote
principle might help entrench management by
insulating the firm from the market for corporate
control. On the other hand, for entrepreneurial
companies, issuing nonvoting stock might be opti-
mal because it helps preserve the founding family’s
private control benefits.
Harris and Raviv (1988) derive results that are
less ambiguous than those of Grossman and Hart
(1988). As mentioned above, a major difference
between the two approaches is that Harris and Raviv
do not assume, as Grossman and Hart do, that the
shareholder’s subjective probability of being pivotal
to the success of a tender offer is zero. Also, while
Grossman and Hart concentrate on how to maximize
the public value of the firm, Harris and Raviv look at
social optimality also. Social optimality is achieved
when the sum of the public and the private values
of the firm takes on a maximum. Harris and Raviv
show that, in a regime in which the simple majority
rule and the one share–one vote principle apply,
the investor that will run the firm most efficiently
obtains control. While this regime ensures the
socially optimal outcome, it generally does not
maximize the public value of the firm. The authors
show that, in a dual-class stock regime in which
one class of stock has all the voting rights and the
other class has all the cash flow rights, the public
value of the firm takes on its maximum. This is
because, with dual-class stock, the securities holders
are able to extract a larger fraction of the rival
investor’s private control benefits. This finding is
similar to an aforementioned result obtained by
Grossman and Hart. In summary, Harris and Raviv
show that the one share–one vote principle in com-
bination with the simple majority rule is, in general,
socially optimal because it maximizes the sum of
the public and the private values of the firm. To
maximize the public value of the firm, the firm
should issue dual-class stock that separates voting
rights from cash flow rights.
The present study follows Grossman and Hart
(1988) in that we assume that the subjective proba-
bility of the small shareholder being pivotal to the
takeover success is zero. Like Harris and Raviv
(1988), the focus is on maximizing social welfare
rather than just the public value of the firm. In
contrast to any of these studies, the analysis is not
restricted to tender offers, but also allows for block
trades. Also, hold-up situations that supermajorities
might create are discussed, as is the potentially
beneficial role of mandatory tender offers.
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Takeovers are typically brought about through
successful tender offers or block trades. In both
types of transactions, there is at least one bidder
extending an offer to the firm’s current equity
holders. When a rival bidder contests the offer, the
takeover resembles an auction. In takeovers, the
auctioned object is control over the firm, which is
tied to the firm’s voting stock.
There are common value and private value
auctions. In common value auctions, there are no
benefits arising from equity ownership that are not
common to all bidders. The common value in take-
overs is the present value of the firm’s cash flows.
In private value auctions, on the other hand, the
value of the firm depends on the bidder. Private
value matters in takeovers if bidders derive private
benefits from exercising control over the firm. In
such cases, the firm might then be valued above
the present value of its cash flows.
In auctions, the current owners have reserva-
tion prices. A reservation price is the price below
which the current owner is not willing to trade.
For reservations prices, too, private benefits might
matter. For instance, if the takeover target is an
entrepreneurial firm, it is likely that due to the
entrepreneur’s private control benefits the reser-
vation price of the seller exceeds the present value
of the auctioned firm’s cash flows.
Takeover bidding resembles English auctions,
which have an ascending bid structure, and the
auctioned firm goes to the investor who submits
the highest bid. Although this outcome is efficient,
the firm might sell for a price that is less than the
winning bidder is willing to pay. Such an outcome
is possible because all it takes to win the bid is an
offer that supersedes, even by the smallest possible
increment, the bidder with the next-to-highest
willingness to pay.6
The Winner’s Curse
In a takeover, a bidder might overpay because
he overestimates the target firm’s present value of
cash flows.7 Even if the bidder has unbiased expec-
tations, a random error in these expectations may
cause his willingness to pay to exceed the firm’s
intrinsic value. This phenomenon is called the win-
ner’s curse.8 Below we illustrate the concept of the
winner’s curse in two examples. The first example
shows that a winning bidder need not overpay even
if he overestimates the intrinsic value of the auc-
tioned object. The second example is a case in which
a bidder who overestimates does indeed overpay.
To keep matters simple, we illustrate the winner’s
curse for a common value auction.
In this first example, assume that there are two
bidders, A and D. Both bidders have unbiased expec-
tations about the present value of the firm’s future
cash flows, which equals $100. Because of a random
element in expectations, D estimates the intrinsic
value of the target at $102, while A estimates it at
$98.9 While both bidders’ expectations are off the
mark, as a group the bidders’ expectations are cor-
rect (unbiased). In a bidding contest, D will end up
with the firm at a price marginally above $98, with-
out overpaying.
In the second example, assume there are two
additional bidders, B and C, in addition to bidders A
and D from the first example. The expectations of
bidders B and C about future cash flows are $99 and
$101, respectively. Again, as a group the expecta-
tions of the four bidders are unbiased as they aver-
age the intrinsic value of the auctioned object. As
in the first example, D wins out. This time, D pays
marginally more than $101. Although D pays less
than he is willing to pay, he nevertheless overpays
because the intrinsic value of the auctioned firm is
only $100.
In summary, the winner’s curse concept rests
on estimation errors, although these estimation
errors need not be systematic. The winning bidder
might, but need not, overpay. As the number of
bidders rises, however, the probability that the win-
ning bidder overpays increases, all else equal.
Empirical studies show that in takeover contests
all the gains (if any) tend to go to the shareholders
of the target firm. On average, the shareholders of
the acquiring firm break even. There is no evidence
that in takeovers bidders overpay systematically; in
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6 In Dutch auctions, the bid structure is descending. The auctioneer
calls prices in descending order, and the first bidder to shout “mine”
wins out. See Milgrom (1989).
7 If the bidder is a company that merges the target into its existing
operations, the value the bidder assigns to the target is not the present
value of the target firm’s cash flows on a stand-alone basis. Rather, it
is the difference between the present value of the cash flows of the
combined firm and the sum of the present values of the cash flows
of the two firms when operating on a stand-alone basis.
8 For an overview on the winner’s curse, see Milgrom (1989) and Thaler
(1988).
9 The two bidders’ expectations may be viewed as independent draws
from the same probability distribution, which is symmetric around
the expected value.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Schmidthe following sections, we make use of this empirical
finding.10 We exclude overpaying by assuming that
the intrinsic value of the firm is public knowledge.
TENDER OFFERS AND FREE-RIDING
Tender offers are public bids for stock in which
investors can tender their shares in the target firm
to a bidder at a certain price within a certain time
window. As mentioned above, tender offers are
called restricted if this offer applies to a certain
fraction of shares only. Otherwise, the offers are
called unrestricted. In addition, tender offers may
be conditional or unconditional. If the offer is con-
ditional, the bidder is not obliged to acquire the
tendered shares if their fraction in the total outstand-
ing stock falls short of a pre-announced minimum.
In tender offers, the shares are typically dis-
persed among small shareholders. The dispersion
of the shares gives rise to a free-riding problem,
which might thwart value-enhancing takeovers. In
the following, we analyze the free-riding problem
in a common value bidding contest. Because the
free-riding problem is independent of the number of
bidders, one can assume without loss of generality
that there is no rival bidder contesting the takeover
attempt.
Assume that there is a target company with
2 million shareholders, each holding one share.
Before news of the bid reaches the market, the
target trades at $1 a share. The bidder is a buyout
fund that plans on taking control of the firm and
improving the efficiency of the operations. The
bidder expects this transaction to add $1 million
(or $0.5 per share) to the target’s present value of
cash flows. We assume that the value added is
public knowledge. This is a reasonable assumption
for large, traded firms, which are closely followed
by financial analysts.
For each shareholder of the target firm, the
objective probability that his decision is pivotal to
the success of the takeover, or to the bidder’s decision
to better the offer while it is outstanding, is only
marginally greater than zero.11 We follow Grossman
and Hart (1988) in assuming that each shareholder’s
subjective probability of being pivotal is zero. This
assumption implies that small shareholders are
unable to enjoy control benefits.
We assume that the tender offer is conditional
(restricted or unrestricted), which means that the
bidder acquires the tendered shares only if he suc-
ceeds in seizing control. In the absence of super-
majority rules, we set the control threshold to 50
percent plus one share.
In the first example, assume that the bidder
owns no stock in the target when launching the
tender offer. The target firm’s shareholders have an
incentive not to tender if the bid falls short of the
stock’s post-takeover value. This response occurs
because no shareholder assumes that his decision
is pivotal to the outcome of the takeover attempt
and each shareholder therefore pursues his best
interest. By doing so, however, the shareholders
thwart the efficient social outcome. If, for instance,
the bidder offers $1.4 a share, the target shareholder
will end up with $1.4 if he tenders and the takeover
succeeds. If he tenders and the takeover fails, he
winds up with $1. On the contrary, if he does not
tender, the payoffs in these two situations are $1.5
and $1, respectively. Thus, for the target shareholder,
it is optimal not to tender in response to a bid that
falls short of the post-takeover share price. On the
other hand, for the bidder, a price of $1.5 or higher
is unprofitable. Consequently, the takeover—in spite
of being value-enhancing—does not materialize.
In the second example, assume that the bidder
acquired a toehold in the target firm in the open
market at $1 a share before announcing the tender
offer. Again, the target shareholder does not tender
unless the bid matches the post-takeover share price
of $1.5. Because of the toehold, the bidder is able
to reap part of the value added even when paying
$1.5 a share. If, for instance, the toehold amounts
to 5 percent, the bidder retains $50,000 of the value
added, while the other $950,000 go to the target
shareholders.12 The takeover materializes, and the
efficient outcome obtains.13
In the third example, assume that the rival
investor is a wealthy individual who enjoys benefits
from having control. When announcing the bid, the
investor holds no stock in the target firm. The bidder
values the private control benefits at $150,000.
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10 For a survey on empirical studies on post-takeover performance, see
Weston, Chung, and Siu (1998).
11 Takeover regulation typically requires that when an outstanding bid
is bettered, the new price uniformly applies to all tendered shares,
including those that have already been tendered.
12 Many jurisdictions around the world restrict the size of toeholds that
investors can accumulate without having to disclose it to the public,
the target firm, or the competent stock market supervisory authority.
For instance, the threshold for disclosure might equal 5 percent of the
company’s total equity or the equity within a certain class of stock.
13 For an extensive analysis on the role of toeholds on the success of
takeovers, see Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
Schmid REVIEWThus, if the takeover succeeds, another $150,000
in value is added because of private control bene-
fits, beyond the $1 million the investor would add
through improving the target firm’s operations.
The total value added through the takeover would
amount to $1.15 million. Similar to toeholds, private
control benefits help overcome the free-riding prob-
lem in tender offers. The target shareholders’ pay-
off matrix is identical to the first two examples. The
bidder is willing to pay a price equal to the post-
takeover (public) value of the target ($1.5 a share)
because the takeover allows the entrepreneur to real-
ize private control benefits equivalent to $150,000.
The above examples assumed the tender offers
to be conditional. It turns out that the incentives
that prevail in an otherwise identical unconditional
tender offer are more conducive to a successful
takeover. In the first example discussed above, if the
tender offer were unconditional, the target share-
holder would receive $1.4 for certain if he tendered,
with no change in payoff if he did not tender. This
means that the shareholder is more likely to tender
if the tender offer is unconditional. For instance, if
the small shareholder attaches equal probabilities
to the takeover failing or coming to pass, the expected
value of the share if not tendered amounts to $1.25,
which is short of the risk-free $1.4 paid on the ten-
dered share.
Another instrument for solving the free-riding
problem is the two-tier offer. The bidder makes a
favorable “front end” offer for the fraction of shares
he needs to obtain control and an unfavorable
“back end” offer for the remainder. For instance, a
bidding corporation might offer cash for the first
50 percent plus one share and newly issued shares
for the remainder.14 After the bidder obtains control
through the cash offer, the bidder might find ways
of depressing the firm’s public value before forging
a “back-end” merger under conditions favorable to
him. One way to depress the value is to dilute the
firm’s earnings. Dilution of earnings is possible, for
instance, through asset transfers or through trans-
fer pricing of inter-firm trade in intermediate prod-
ucts. Transfer pricing and asset transfers below fair
market value violate the arm’s-length principle and
might be illegal, depending on the jurisdiction.15
Also, as two-tier offers discriminate between front-
end purchase and back-end conversion, the investor
might violate duties of equal shareholder treatment.
The tender offer is coercive, as the shareholders
feel compelled to be in the first tier.
THE ONE SHARE–ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE
Harris and Raviv (1988) have shown that the
one share–one vote principle is generally optimal
for society and suboptimal for the securities holders.
Also, Grossman and Hart (1988) have shown that
deviations from the one share–one vote rule might
be optimal from the securities holders’ point of
view. In the following, the implications of violations
of the one share–one vote principle for the value
of the firm is analyzed in two numerical examples.
Firms might deviate from the one share–one
vote rule by issuing preferred stock, which may be
either stock endowed with multiple votes or non-
voting stock with preferred cash flow rights. In some
jurisdictions, issuing stock with multiple votes is
prohibited. Also, legislation might limit nonvoting
stock to a certain fraction of the firm’s total equity.
We analyze a firm with dual-class stock. Class A
stock is common (voting) stock, and class B stock is
preferred (nonvoting) stock. Each class of stock is
endowed with the same cash flow rights. As above,
we allow for two types of investors: block holders
and small shareholders. We maintain the assump-
tion that shareholders are investors who each hold
one share and attach a subjective probability of
zero to being pivotal to the success of a takeover
attempt. Class B stock is held entirely by small
shareholders—because they do not value control
anyway—whereas class A stock might be held by
small shareholders or by block holders. We also
assume that the marginal investor in class A stock
is a small shareholder, which means that both
classes of stock trade at the same price.16 In each
class of stock, there are 1 million shares outstanding.
In this first example, we assume that initially
all A shares are held by small shareholders. The
firm operates efficiently, and class A and class B
stocks trade at $1 a share. Assume that there is an
investor who—if he were in control—would enjoy
private control benefits but would not run the firm
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14 Prorating applies if more than 50 percent plus one share are tendered
in the first tier. We assume that there is no supermajority rule in place.
15 The arm’s length principle stipulates that trade among affiliated com-
panies has to be conducted at prices that would prevail in correspond-
ing market transactions with unaffiliated companies.
16 It is the marginal investor that prices financial assets. Empirically,
nonvoting stock may trade higher or lower than voting stock. While
the lack of control rights creates a discount on nonvoting stock, prefer-
ential cash flow rights generate a premium. Also, for entrepreneurial
firms, the float of nonvoting stock frequently exceeds the float of
voting stock, which generates a liquidity discount on the voting stock.
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the private value of the firm (which is the mone-
tary equivalent of the control benefits) might equal
$150,000 and the public value of the firm might
amount to $0.9 a share. The decrease in public value
might be due to the fact that the investor employs
firm resources to generate private benefits, for
instance in the form of luxurious offices and lavish
business dinners. If the investor succeeded in taking
over the firm, social welfare would decrease by
$50,000. This is because the sum of the post-takeover
public and private values ($1,950,000) falls short
of the company’s pre-takeover value ($2 million).
The investor can obtain control over the firm
by acquiring a minimum amount of class A shares,
which—in the absence of supermajority rules—is
50 percent plus one share. If the investor bids $1.01
a share for the class A shares in a (unrestricted and
unconditional) tender offer, the takeover attempt
will be successful. This holds in spite of its value-
depressing effect on society. At $1.01 a share, the
small shareholder tenders. If the small shareholder
does not tender, his position is worth $0.9 if the
takeover succeeds and remains at $1 if it does not
succeed. On the other hand, if the small shareholder
tenders, he receives $1.01 for certain. Consequently,
all shareholders tender their interests and the take-
over succeeds. The investor loses $110,000 on his
investment in A shares, but gains $150,000 in private
control benefits. The loss to society ($50,000) is the
difference between the decrease in public value
($100,000) and the increase in private control
benefits ($50,000).
By comparison, the one share–one vote princi-
ple generates the efficient outcome by giving the
investor no incentive to bid. Under the one share–
one vote rule, the investor has to extend a tender
offer to all shareholders by bidding $1.01 for each
of the 2 million shares. The investor would lose
$220,000 on the equity interest but gain only the
equivalent of $150,000 in control benefits. A take-
over succeeds if (and only if) the total value added
is positive, which means that the gain in private
benefits must exceed the loss in public value.17 Note
that even a toehold would not help the investor
succeed in the takeover attempt.
In the second example, we assume that the firm
in question is family-owned. The family holds all
of the class A shares, but none of the nonvoting
stock. The public value of the firm equals $1.8
million with the B shares trading at $0.9 a share.18
The family enjoys private control benefits equivalent
to $150,000.
In many countries, dual-class stock is a common
phenomenon with family-owned companies. Fre-
quently, as entrepreneurial firms grow, the wealth-
constrained founding family is unable to maintain
its fraction of equity in the firm following public
offerings. By issuing nonvoting stock, the family
might be able to retain control even after floating
equity in the stock market.
Assume that the founding family is in its second
generation and that the entrepreneurial skills left
the company when the founder left. An institutional
investor—a buyout fund, for instance—might be
able to run the company more efficiently, without
enjoying control benefits. Assume that, if the buy-
out fund were in control, the public value of the
company would amount to $2 million, with B shares
trading at $1 a share. Although society would be
better off, scoring a net gain of $50,000, in a dual-
class stock regime the optimal outcome does not
obtain. This occurs because, to the family, the class
A equity interest is worth $1,050,000 (private value
of $150,000 plus public value of $900,000), which
exceeds the post-takeover public value of the class
A stock by $50,000.
The takeover can succeed in spite of the pres-
ence of dual-class stock if the buyout fund acquires
an interest in class B stock before bidding for the
family’s stake. If the investor—before revealing the
takeover plan—accumulated a position in B shares
in excess of 50 percent in the open market at a price
of $0.9, he would be able to buy out the family.
This outcome can occur because the capital gain
on the class B equity position would exceed the
difference between the family’s and the buyout
fund’s valuations of the class A equity. The buyout
fund could pursue this strategy only if there were
no stock ownership disclosure rules that would
force the investor to reveal the buildup of the class
B interest in the early stages of the buyout. Once
the buyout fund’s intentions leak to the market, B
shareholders have an incentive to free-ride.
In the one share–one vote regime the situation
is similar. With the family holding 50 percent (plus
one share) of the voting stock and the rest being
dispersed, the only way a rival investor can seize
control is to buy out the family. The same incentives
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inefficiency the investor causes is sufficiently high, the optimal out-
come also prevails in the dual-class stock regime.
18 Note that A shares do not trade. With B shares trading at $0.9 a share,
the shadow price of the family’s stake equals $900,000.
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apply in the one share–one vote regime. If the buy-
out fund is unable to accumulate (secretly) a posi-
tion in excess of 25 percent in the open market at
$0.9 a share, the investor has no incentive to bid
for the family’s equity interest.
The equivalence in outcomes in the two regimes
is due to the specific assumptions made in the exam-
ple. First, the fraction of voting stock was limited to
50 percent of the company’s total equity; second,
no supermajority rule was in place. Under such
conditions, family owners have no incentive to issue
nonvoting stock in lieu of voting stock. However, if
the law requires supermajorities for certain deci-
sions, the equivalence breaks down and dual-class
stock becomes an important tool for protecting the
family owner’s private control benefits. This is dis-
cussed in the next section.
PRIVATE BENEFITS, SUPERMAJORITY
RULES, AND DUAL-CLASS STOCK
In some jurisdictions around the world, corpo-
rate law mandates that certain decisions at annual
meetings require supermajorities of two-thirds or
75 percent of the votes. Among the issues that are
typically subject to supermajority rules are changes
to the company’s equity (e.g., securities offerings
or stock repurchases) and major changes to assets
(e.g., mergers and major acquisitions). The existence
of supermajority rules implies the existence of
blocking minority rules. For instance, with a 75
percent supermajority rule in place, a block holder
can paralyze a corporation when holding 25 percent
plus one vote. A blocking minority interest creates
bargaining power vis-à-vis a family owner whose
holding might have dropped below the 75 percent
threshold due to a binding wealth constraint.
Generally, supermajority rules imply that family
owners must retain greater fractions of shares to
stay in control. In the following we show that the
one share–one vote regime is not necessarily opti-
mal when private control benefits exist and corpo-
rate law mandates supermajorities for important
decisions.
As an example, assume an entrepreneurial firm
where the owner family’s fraction of voting stock
amounts to 60 percent. The remaining 40 percent
have been floated in the stock market as the com-
pany expanded through public offerings and the
family was unable to acquire the additional stock
due to its limited wealth. Assume that dual-class
stock is prohibited and that the law mandates a 75
percent supermajority for major corporate decisions.
The company is run efficiently. The stock trades at
$1 a share with a 1.2 million share float, which is
dispersed. Effectively, the entrepreneur has com-
mand over the necessary supermajority. Dispersed
shareholders exercise no control, because they view
their probabilities of being pivotal as zero. Also,
because the company is run efficiently, the share-
holders have no incentive to reject or disapprove
of the entrepreneur’s operating decisions. The
entrepreneur enjoys private control benefits, which
he values at $150,000.
Assume that there is a rival investor who attaches
a monetary equivalent of $75,000 to the control
rights that come with a blocking minority interest
in the company in question. The control benefits
might emanate from personal pleasure of influenc-
ing the business decisions of this particular com-
pany or from reduced competition if the investor is
a rival.19 Assume that the rival investor’s business
goals are at odds with those of the entrepreneur,
which paralyzes decisionmaking. The gridlock
reduces the present value of the firm’s cash flows
from $2 million to $1.8 million.
If the rival investor accumulates a block of 25
percent plus one share in the open market at $1 a
share and pursues the business strategy outlined
above, he will lose a little more than $50,000 on
the acquired shares but gain $75,000 in private
control benefits. At the same time, the value of the
remaining equity (75 percent minus one share)
drops by a little less than $150,000. Also, the family
loses its control benefits of $150,000 in part or in
total. Overall, the net loss to society amounts to at
least $125,000 (and at most $275,000). Despite the
one share–one vote rule in place, the inefficient
outcome prevails.20
With dual-class stock, the value-reducing con-
trol change can be prevented. Assume that the
entrepreneur is allowed to issue nonvoting stock
at a maximum of 50 percent of the corporation’s
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19For instance, for certain decisions, the German Stock Corporation Act
requires supermajorities at annual shareholder meetings. In Germany,
it has repeatedly been observed (in particular in the media industry)
that investors take blocking minority interests in competitors, which
all but paralyzes these companies before the original owners eventually
surrender their stakes.
20 If the small shareholders anticipate the decrease in the public value
of the firm and assume that it will be sustained, they sell to the outside
investor at $0.9 a share. This does not affect the change in wealth to
society overall, but affects solely the distribution of wealth between
the original (small) shareholders and the outside block holder.
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equity, the entrepreneur is able to retain all the
voting stock (and also holds 20 percent of the non-
voting stock). The rival investor has no means of
seizing control over the firm without fully compen-
sating the family owner. This scenario implies that,
if the rival is not able to generate at least as much
value as the incumbent, he is unable to gain control.
Thus we conclude that in the presence of super-
majority rules (i.e., blocking minority rules), the
entrepreneurial firm should be allowed to deviate
from the one share–one vote rule by issuing non-
voting stock.
BLOCK TRADES
In some of the examples above we have alluded
to block trades as a means of transferring control
over the firm. An example of a block trade is when
a family sells out to a single investor rather than
floating the block of shares in the stock market.
Block trades are private deals rather than open-
market transactions. It has been observed that in
block trades the price per share exceeds the going
share price in the open market.21 The concept of
the Nash bargaining solution offers a possible expla-
nation for the existence of such block premiums.
In a Nash bargaining solution the two parties share
the surplus from cooperation evenly.22
To illustrate the block premium as it evolves
from a Nash bargaining solution, we look at the
example from the preceding section where, in a
one share–one vote regime, a rival investor paralyzes
an entrepreneurial corporation. We assume that, if
the rival took full control by buying out the family
owner, the present value of the company’s cash
flows would be back to what it was prior to the rival
investor taking a blocking minority interest. This
situation implies that the rival has an incentive to
pursue a cooperative strategy by bidding for the
family’s equity stake; in this way he could increase
the value of his original position of 25 percent plus
one share by a little more than $50,000. Conversely,
it may be advantageous for the family to accept the
bid. If, for instance, the family has lost all its private
control benefits, selling out to the intruder becomes
advantageous as it allows the family to reap capital
gains on its 60 percent equity stake.
Two cooperative outcomes are conceivable.
Either the family sells out to the rival investor, or
the rival sells out to the family. If the family buys
out the rival, he (or any other investor with similar
preferences) would repeat this game ad infinitum.
This is because, by selling out, the investor would
generate gains from cooperation, which—in a Nash
bargaining solution—are shared evenly by the two
parties. This means that the rival investor does not
only gain when acquiring the blocking minority
interest, he also gains when selling it. Thus, the only
viable strategy is that the family sells out to the rival
(which assumes that the rival investor’s wealth
constraint is not binding).
In the noncooperative situation (in which the
rival investor paralyzes the company), the family’s
wealth equals $1,080,000 (the equity interest of the
family, which has lost all its control benefits). The
wealth of the rival investor amounts to a little more
than $525,000 (the rival investor’s financial position
plus his control benefits). Added up between the two
parties, total wealth is little more than $1,605,000.
If the family sells out, total wealth increases to a
little more than $1,775,000 (assuming that the
intruder’s control benefits remain unchanged).
The gain from cooperation equals a little more
than $170,000, which is shared evenly between
the two parties. Consequently, the block of shares
changes hands at a little more than $1,165,000,
which implies a price per share of about $0.97. This
is $0.07 above the company’s share price based on
the present value of cash flows in the noncoopera-
tive state.
Compared with the situation before the intruder
shows up at the company’s gates, the family loses
(a little less than) $185,000, while the intruder gains
(a little less than) $110,000. Society as a whole loses
$75,000, which is the difference between the fam-
ily’s control benefits ($150,000) and the intruder’s
private benefits ($75,000). The intruder winds up
with 85 percent of the voting stock.
MANDATORY TENDER OFFERS
With a mandatory offer rule in place, an
investor has to make a tender offer for the remain-
ing shares once he has obtained control. The U.K.
“City Code” offers the most prominent example of
takeover regulation with a mandatory tender offer
in place. Control in the U.K. City Code is defined as
30 percent of the voting stock.23 Once an investor
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21 See, for instance, Franks and Mayer (2000).
22 For a textbook example of the Nash bargaining solution, see Hart
(1995).
23 For “City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Rules Governing
Substantial Acquisition of Shares,” see <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.
org.uk>.
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to make an (unconditional) offer for all remaining
shares. In the following we show that mandatory
tender offers protect small shareholders against
block trades in which the trading parties gain at
the expense of the small shareholders.
In this first example, there is no mandatory
tender offer rule in place. We look at a company
with 2 million shares outstanding. All shares are
voting stock. An institutional investor holds the
majority of shares (50 percent plus one share), with
the remaining shares being dispersed. The incum-
bent investor operates the corporation efficiently
but—because it is an institution rather than an
individual—generates no private control benefits.
The company trades at $1 a share. We assume that
there is no supermajority rule in place.
Suppose there is a private investor who, if he
were in control, would enjoy private control benefits
but would not run the firm efficiently. For instance,
if the investor were to gain control, the private value
of the firm would equal $150,000 and the public
value of the firm would amount to $0.9 a share. The
drop in the company’s public value might be due
to the investor’s funding of perquisites through the
company.
If control changed from the institutional to the
private investor, society would lose $50,000. We
show that, without a mandatory tender offer rule
in place, the takeover indeed happens. In contrast,
with mandatory tender offer regulation, the efficient
outcome prevails.
As outlined above, in a Nash bargaining solution
the two parties share the surplus from cooperation
evenly. The surplus generated for the two parties
when control changes from the institutional investor
to the private investor equals a little less than
$50,000. Splitting the surplus evenly would imply
a price for the 50 percent-plus-one-vote block of a
little more than $1,025,000. By selling out, the
institutional investor gains a little less than $25,000,
and so does the personal investor. Society overall
loses $50,000. The small shareholders suffer a loss
close to $100,000.
With mandatory takeover regulation in place,
an investor does not succeed in taking over an effi-
ciently operated firm if he is unable to add value to
society. This is because the investor must acquire
all shares. He always pays at least fair market value,
be it in block trades or open market operations prior
to taking control or in the mandatory tender offer.
While the arguments put forward in favor of
mandatory tender offers are strong, it is noteworthy
that this rule does not find unanimous support
among traded corporations. For instance, Germany
introduced a takeover code in 1995 as a voluntary
guideline. As of April 11, 2000, only 540 of 933 listed
German firms had signed the Takeover Code. Among
the companies that have not signed on are BMW AG
and Volkswagen AG.24 A possible reason why com-
panies find the code objectionable is that a manda-
tory tender offer rule does not allow them to hold
minority positions in companies to protect relation-
specific investments. Automobile companies fre-
quently take positions in subcontractors to insulate
themselves against opportunistic behavior. This
position is most important where suppliers also
provide part or all of the research and development
that pertains to the delivered intermediate products.25
CONCLUSION
In a series of numerical examples we analyzed
the impact of the one share–one vote principle, the
simple majority rule, and mandatory tender offer
regulation from the perspective of a socially optimal
market for corporate control. Maximizing social
welfare means maximizing the sum of the private
and public values of the firm, rather than maxi-
mizing public value only. While our analysis is too
simple to draw policy conclusions, we agree with
Harris and Raviv (1988) that the simultaneous
presence of the one share–one vote principle and
the simple majority rule is generally optimal. At
the same time, the analysis lends strong support to
prohibiting restricted tender offers and to legalizing
mandatory tender offers.
The simple majority rule ensures that the incum-
bent investor and the rival investor are on equal
footing. The one share–one vote principle in com-
bination with a mandatory tender offer regulation
forces the rival investor to acquire all the cash flow
rights if he wants to obtain control. This prevents
value-decreasing takeovers because the rival investor
succeeds only if he is able to raise the sum of the
private and the public values of the firm beyond
the level that comes with the incumbent investor.
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24 For details, see the German Takeover Commission’s Web site at
<http://www.kodex.de>. The site also posts the list of signatories.
As a result of the low acceptance of the Takeover Code, the commis-
sion recommended to the legislature to write the code (in a revised
form) into law.
25 For a classic study on subcontracting relations in the automobile sec-
tor, see Asanuma (1989), who analyzes Toyota Motor Company.
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particularly harmful to society. On one hand, full
control requires more than 50 percent (plus one
share) of the voting stock, which puts the rival
investor at a disadvantage in relation to the incum-
bent. On the other hand, a minority interest is
sufficient to block important decisions. An investor
who holds a minority interest can paralyze the firm
and expropriate the incumbent investor of his pri-
vate control benefits. The situation can be avoided
with a mandatory tender offer where the offer
threshold is set to the blocking minority threshold.
Generally, mandatory supermajority rules should
come with mandatory tender offers.
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